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Abstract 
My main aim is to present the phenomena related to fulfilment and breach of promises 
and the economic, political and ethical problems arising from these. I discuss questions 
that we all meet with in daily life and see mentioned in the press, other forums of public 
discourse, gatherings of friends, or sessions of Parliament. There are some who complain 
that a building contractor has not done a renovation job properly according to contract. 
Economists argue over the outcome of late repayments on loans advanced for purchasing 
real estate. Opposition meetings chide the governing party over unfulfilled campaign 
promises. I am seeking what is common among these seemingly different cases. Can we 
see identical or similar behavior patterns and social mechanisms in them? Do they lead to 
similar decision-making dilemmas and reactions? 
 
Key words: political promises, economic institutions, behaviour patterns, social 
mechanisms 
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Introduction
1
 
 
I was still in high school when I first read that harrowing ballad by Friedrich Schiller, “Die 
Bürgschaft”, the guarantor (Schiller [1794], 2004) 2 
 In the ballad, a man named Damon sneaks into the court of the ancient Greek city of 
Syracuse with a dagger under his toga, intent on stabbing the tyrant Dionysus, but he is 
arrested by the guards and brought before the tyrant, who condemns him to be crucified. 
Damon does not plead for mercy, but asks for three days’ parole, so that he can give away his 
sister in marriage. He will leave a friend as a guarantor, who may be executed in his stead if 
he fails to return. The tyrant agrees and the friend steps in. Damon dashes away to the 
wedding, and tries to return just as fast. 
 But the weather is against him. There is a fearful storm, causing the river to flood and 
washing away the bridge. Damon manages to swim across, but then meets with a band of 
robbers whom he has to fight off. Eventually he reaches the edge of the city, only to hear that 
the friend he left as a guarantor is being raised up on the cross. People advise him at least to 
save himself, but he bursts through the crowd to embrace his friend. The news reaches the 
tyrant, who relents of what Damon has been through and what self-sacrifice Damon’s friend 
has shown, feeling certain that Damon would not break his promise. The tyrant turns to the 
pair and says: 
 
  In truth, fidelity is no idle delusion, 
  So accept me also as your friend, 
  I would be – grant me this request – 
  The third in your band!  
 
 And now let us turn from the realm of poetry to that of reality, from ancient Greece to 
present-day Hungary. I often go to a retreat for scholars, where I’ve come to know the kind 
waitresses in the dining room well. One of them, Éva, took out a bank loan to buy a flat and a 
                                                          
1
 I am grateful for their help in the research and their useful advice to the following colleagues: Zsuzsa Dániel, 
Tamás Keller, János Köllő, Sylvie Lupton, Boglárka Molnár, Mária Móra and István György Tóth. Let me thank 
the translators, Brian McLean and László Tóth. The attentive and efficient contribution of my assistants, Rita 
Fancsovits, Klára Gurzó and Andrea Reményi, means a lot to me. And my thanks go to  Corvinus University of 
Budapest for the inspirative environment and the support for my research. 
2
  Schiller’s poem has been translated to English several times. Below I quote Scott Horton’s translation, published 
in 2007. Horton translates the German Bürgschaft to ’hostage’ in the title and in the text at a point, though the 
latter rather means Giesel in German. In the context of my study the English guarantor  is a better match, which 
also happens to appear in Horton’s translation.      
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car, and the bank’s terms required the signatures of two guarantors. She asked Vera and 
Klára, colleagues of long standing and personal friends, who agreed to act as guarantors.3 Éva 
promised the bank and her two friends that she would service the loan properly. But in the end 
she let everyone down. She did not pay the installments and fled from her obligations. The 
bank is charging the debt on the two guarantors. 
  In the ballad it is a matter of life and death. The promiser goes through fearful 
vicissitudes to keep his word. The guarantor is set free. In the real case, the breach of contract 
by the promiser did not spell death for the two guarantors, but it means that two women with 
financial problems of their own are left to wrestle bitterly with the debt, because their 
colleague and friend broke her promise and failed to meet her obligations. 
 What significance does keeping promises bear? Why do so many people break their 
promises? What consequences ensue from this flood of promise-breaking? These are 
questions this study sets out to address. Though this paper is illustrated mainly by Hungarian 
examples, I assume that the problems brought up here are present also elsewhere, and my 
argumentation can be used to analyze this complex issue also beyond the Hungarian borders. 
 
Conceptual clarification 
The term promise is clear: someone, the promiser or maker of the promise – one person or a 
group or an organization (e. g. a firm, a state agency, a party, or a government) – undertakes 
an obligation to the promised, the beneficiary of the promise. Again the latter may be one 
person or a group (e. g. the population of a city or a country) or an organization. In the 
Schiller ballad Damon was the promiser and the tyrant and the friend were the promised; in 
the Hungarian story Éva, the debtor was the promiser and the bank plus the two colleagues 
serving as guarantors were the promised. 
 A promise may be unilateral, so that the promiser expects no recompense from the 
promised, or it may be bilateral, so that a pair of reciprocal promises appears: promiser A 
stipulates at the time of formulation and utterance of the promise that B, to whom the promise 
is made, will simultaneously make a promise of which A is the beneficiary. Both make a 
promise contingent on reciprocity. Such a promise contingent on reciprocity is known as a 
contract (Sharp 1934, p. 27). I fulfill my promise on the understanding that you will fulfill 
yours. 
                                                          
3
 The story is real, but I have changed the names. 
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 This study considers both types simultaneously in the main. I allude to the distinction 
between them only where my argument requires it. 
 A promise is often made in an informal way. If I order lunch in a restaurant, we do not 
draw up a contract, but I promise implicitly to pay the bill after eating the lunch. Other 
promises have a formal framework, e. g. a solemn oath is taken in the presence of witnesses 
according to a traditional ceremony. It is very common for a detailed contract to be drawn up 
in writing, where the contracting parties describe their obligations precisely. 
 There is no clear dividing line between informal and formal promises; there are many 
transitional cases. The possibility of enforcing fulfillment depends among other things on 
whether the promise has been formalized. This study disregards in several places the 
distinctions with regard to formalization. 
 To forestall misunderstandings, let me point out that the fulfillment of promise/breach 
of promise pair of opposites do not coincide with another pair of opposites to which great 
attention is paid: whether a statement is true or false. Both contrast words with reality, but 
this study examines a special form of contrast. The question of truth/falsehood contrasts 
words uttered at a given time with the reality of that time or a past time, or perhaps with a 
reality quite independent of the speaker. The question of fulfillment/breach of promise 
contrasts the words being uttered now with the subsequent conduct of the speaker and final 
result after a period. 
 
Defining the subject-matter 
My main aim is to present the phenomena related to fulfillment and breach of promises and 
the economic, political and ethical problems arising from these. I discuss questions that we all 
meet with in daily life and see mentioned in the press, other forums of public discourse, 
gatherings of friends, or sessions of Parliament. There are some who complain that a building 
contractor has not done a renovation job properly according to contract. Economists argue 
over the outcome of late repayments on loans advanced for purchasing real estate. Opposition 
meetings chide the governing party over unfulfilled campaign promises. I am seeking what is 
common among these seemingly different cases. Can we see identical or similar behavior 
patterns and social mechanisms in them? Do they lead to similar decision-making dilemmas 
and reactions?  
 I do not set out to report on the general state of promise fulfillment. I cannot say if the 
world, or even Hungary, has improved or deteriorated in this respect. Although I deal here 
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with observable and in many cases even objectively measurable events, unfortunately there 
are only sporadic data available. 
 The study mentions tasks – what should be done to make promise fulfillment more 
frequent. But I have not sought to devise an action program to this end. 
 The paper draws on experience in Hungary. Hungary’s experience serves solely for 
illustrating certain phenomena and not as evidence for proving general statements.. 
 
 
An initial look: five types of promise 
 
It would be an interesting subject for research to examine breaches of promises between 
individuals in private life, for example by those who dangle a prospect of marriage and fail to 
fulfill it. This study does not deal with private life, concentrating instead on promises closely 
connected to economic and political life. I see five basic types: 
A.  Producers’ promises to users, about what product or service is being offered, when, 
and under what conditions. 
B. Users’ promises to producers, about how much, when, and under what conditions they 
will pay the producer for the goods or services received. 
 Types A and B are usually reciprocal and laid down in a formal or informal contract of 
purchase and sale. However, it is easier to discuss them separately and postpone examining 
the tie between them. 
C. Debtors’ promises to lenders (usually a bank or other financial institution), about 
when and under what conditions the debt will be repaid. 
D. Government (central or local) promises to citizens – all citizens or a certain group of 
them – about what services they will provide for them and under what conditions. 
E. Political promises (by individual politicians, parties or movements) to electors, about 
the program they will implement if they are elected. 
 These five basic types do not include all types of promise made in the economic and 
political spheres, but they suffice to exemplify the interrelations and problems discussed in 
this study. 
 
A.  Producers’ promises to users 
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Daily occurrences in all our lives: the electrician promised to be here by ten, I did not go to 
work so as to be here to receive him, but he failed to come; the roofer undertook to insulate 
the floor of the terrace, but the room beneath got soaked the first time it rained. 
 In each example the promiser is an artisan and the promised a household. In 
subsequent examinations households remain the recipient of the promise, but the sphere of 
promisers extends to all who provide any kind of product or service to them, from hairdresser 
to taxi driver, dentist to cable TV provider. A “producer” may be a one-person firm, or a 
small, medium-sized or large company. 
 Consumers in Hungary have several kinds of body they can turn to with a complaint. 
Figure 1 shows four lines of data, in all of which the numbers of complaint tend upwards. We 
do not know whether grievances actually became commoner or the propensity to lodge an 
official complaint increased. The data certainly do not include all breaches of contract, as in 
most cases the injured do not turn to the authorities for legal redress. 
 Looking at such events from the consumers’ angle, breaking a promise may have 
several kinds of consequences. It may damage the consumer’s material surroundings: the light 
still does not go on in the cellar; repainting the ceiling is costly. Beyond the material loss 
there is damage to the well-being of the aggrieved, who may be outraged in a serious case. 
 The recipient of a promise may be another producer, so that breaking it will cause 
disruption to input-output flows between firms or organizations. A component manufacturer 
which fails to meet the promised deadline for delivery upsets the user company’s production 
plan. Various kinds of loss ensue: a whole line has to be stopped, causing disruption in sales; 
employees stand idle. If the delay is often repeated, the user firm will become cautious and 
build up a greater inventory, which ties down capital. Often the problem is not the arrival 
date, but the quality of the consignment. If the user fails to notice the fault in the input and 
incorporates it into its product, it will damage the quality of its own output, which will cause 
sales losses sooner or later. All these eventualities ultimately reduce the efficiency of the user 
firm or other organization.  
 Here as in households the damage is not just material. All troubles caused by suppliers 
breaking promises annoy users, from workers to managers, and create a bad atmosphere. This 
psychological effect must also be added to the direct consequences of promise-breaking. 
 Especially serious is the damage to producer/user relations that is protracted in time. 
This applies to all longer-term investment projects, including all building construction. When 
the project commences, its input suppliers all shoulder to contractual obligations. All 
participants should fulfill those obligations in consort, in a disciplined way. Any failing or 
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breach of contract disrupts all the other participants as well. The more of them breach contract 
discipline, the graver the shortcomings, the more completion is delayed, and the lower the 
efficiency of the construction and investment becomes. 
 
Figure 1 Number of consumer complaints, 1997 – 2011 
Notes. The Hungarian Authority for Consumer Protection is a central state agency. The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority is a 
central state agency, its general task being to monitor banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions. Its activities include the 
investigation of complaints received from the clients of financial institutions. The Foundation for Consumer Protection is a non-
governmental organization, giving advice and forwarding complaints to the state agency in charge, but having no state authority. 
Conciliatory Bodies are independent state organizations, mediating between parties on the basis of written requests they receive. 
Sources. Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Tanács [Hungarian Authority for Consumer Protection] (2012a, b, c, d), Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami 
Felügyelete [Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority] (2012a, b, c) and Fogyasztóvédelmi Alapítvány [Foundation for Consumer 
Protection] (2012). The latter source yielded the data on the Conciliatory Bodies. 
 
 Users build up self-defense mechanisms. These can be seen also in households. It is 
easy to find the names of artisans or firms on the internet, but many people prefer to use a 
producer or service provider tried out and recommended by a friend or acquaintance. One of 
the most important criteria in such cases is reliability: keeping promises. 
 This applies still more in relations between firms. The procurement department of a 
user firm does not always seek out all possible sources or in every case ask for multiple 
estimates. It may simply place the order with a supplier it already trusts. There emerge 
networks of producers and users that trust each other. Selection by networking has its 
advantages, but also its risks (Woodruff 2004). Such rigid networks reduce competition and 
may rule out in advance potentially advantageous offers. Not infrequently corruption creeps 
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into relations between exclusive partners: strictly commercial conditions are watered down by 
mutual favors; firms may begin to look more leniently on breaches of contract. 
   
B.   Users’ promises to producers 
It may appear self-evident in a market economy that users will pay for products and services 
received. Those buying in a store, or procuring a service in a hairdresser’s or fast shoe-repair 
outlet, naturally fulfill the informal contract behind the transaction straight away, by paying. 
There is a different situation when events are normally protracted: on one side supply of the 
good or performance of the service, and on the other payment for it. This is typical in relations 
between firms, especially on construction or other types of investment projects. If the contract 
so prescribes, part of the price has to be paid in advance. Another installment must be met 
within a given period after arrival of the consignment (say 30 or 60 days). A further part may 
be withheld until the purchaser has tested the article supplied (for instance a piece of technical 
equipment or a building). 
 There are, unfortunately, only very few aggregate data available for breaches of Type 
B promises. 
 Let us begin with households as consumers. I know of no aggregate and detailed 
figures for the debt of households to private producers, but their debt to utility companies is 
reported regularly (Sík 2011, Bernát 2012).4 In 2011 20 per cent, in 2012 22 per cent of the 
households were late with their utility bills. This is three to four times the 6 per cent European 
average. (More on this is in Ingatlan és befektetés, 2012.) 
 If the utility companies were to press consistently for punctual settlement of their bills, 
households breaking their contracts would be in deep trouble, as these service providers have 
a natural monopoly. Electric current and running water are practically indispensable. At first 
sight one would think that this dependency would enforce strong payment discipline. In fact, 
under the political, social and cultural conditions of Hungary, the situation unfolds in a 
different, controversial and confusing, way, and the effect is in the opposite direction. Cutting 
off the electricity or water supply has such dramatic effects that all compassionate people 
would sympathize with the ones who have broken their contracts by failing to pay, so that the 
utilities dare not do it in most cases even in cases when the regulations would allow, and 
social aspects and the consideration of need would not go against the harsh measure either. 
This encourages contract-breaking in others who might be capable of repaying their debt, at 
                                                          
4
 Keller (2012) shows interesting figures about household indebtedness in Visegrád countries. Data based on the 
Eurostat (2011) report, up to 2009, indicate the highest increase of household indebtedness in Hungary.   
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least in part. (At the same time it is not uncommon that families in utter destitution, needing 
social solidarity the most, are left without utility services.) 
 The proportion of firms that fail to make payments when due and break their contracts 
is very high. Missing deadlines is common. It is worth noting that many of the organizations 
behind with their payment obligations are state agencies or publicly or municipally owned 
institutions, such as hospitals, schools and universities.
5
  
 The victims of the contract-breaking in these cases are producing or service-providing 
firms. If they are short of liquidity and do not have an adequate credit rating, late or lost 
revenue may threaten their very existence. Large numbers of them fail. 
 Bankruptcy of firms is on the increase. They may have hit trouble because they failed 
to find buyers in a period of general decline in demand, or because buyers are not seeking 
their goods or services, since they regularly commit Type A breaches of promises by being 
late with their supplies to buyers or sending faulty goods. It may also be because they have 
fallen victim to Type B breaches of promises: they as sellers regularly fulfilled their 
obligations, but users did not pay.
6 
 
Sellers try to cover themselves by laying down in contracts that part of the purchase 
price must be paid in advance (Raiser, Rousse and Steves 2004.), but this only provides 
partial protection. It may eliminate the crude cases of contract breaching where buyers pay 
nothing at all, but it does not prevent them being late with the rest or not paying the residual at 
all. 
 The loss of revenue that rightly belongs to a firm damages its owners, endangers the 
jobs provided by the firm in financial difficulties, and if failure ensures, leads to employees 
being pushed out into the street.  
 As with Type A breaches discussed above, this is not just a question of material losses. 
For the victims of the breaches, they mean an end to peace of mind and a sense of security. 
People become embittered and angry. Protests by entrepreneurs being in trouble because 
unpaid bills are frequent.  
 
C.  Debtors’ promises to lenders 
                                                          
5
  In May 2012 overdue bills of public institutions reached the substantial amount of 42.2 billion forints 
(Népszava 2012). 
6
An example was construction of the Megyer bridge over the Danube, where the government made a contract 
with a main contractor, which farmed out tasks to numerous subcontractors. The work was done properly but the 
government did not pay, and the main contractor could not meet its financial obligations. The subcontractors 
held several demonstrations in protest at this. 
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A producing or service-providing firm provides a commercial loan to a user firm if it does not 
insist on prompt payment of the sale price.This is established practice in market economies: 
customary contracts of purchase and sale lay down the allowed period of payment 
postponement. However, when buyers have exceeded that, forced lending begins: the seller is 
obliged by this breach of contract to increase the amount of commercial credit.  
 Let us turn to the other, greater component of the total amount of credit: bank loans. 
Here the bank, or a bank-like financial organization extends the loans and households, firms 
or other organizations (non-profits, state agencies, voluntary associations etc.) are the debtors. 
So in this respect the debtors are the promisers and the banks the promised. 
 Looking first at debts of households, their indebtedness has proliferated in recent 
years. Large sections of the Hungarian public became addicted to buying on credit. More and 
more people in the previous decade took out larger volumes of credit to buy cars and purchase 
or build housing as well. A very high proportion of such mortgage loans were denominated in 
foreign currencies, notably the Swiss franc, which required much lower rates of interest at the 
time than did loans in the Hungarian national currency, the forint.
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 Two changes ensued after the loans were taken out. Hungary became embroiled in the 
international financial crisis, so that some debtors lost their jobs or saw their income fall 
dramatically. Meanwhile the forint weakened fast against the Swiss franc and other foreign 
currencies. Repayment obligations that seemed tolerable to meet from original household 
incomes became unbearably high. The proportion of the personal debt in arrears rose 
suddenly. This alarming tendency is illustrated by the second and third lines in Tables 1 and 
2. 
 To express this in the language of this study, a high proportion of such households 
have broken their promises to lenders. Many still pay in part or in arrears: they have half-
broken their promises. Others have become irrevocably insolvent, so breaking their promises 
entirely. Here the intention is only to note the phenomenon without going into the detailed 
reasons behind it. Let me just add, however, that the blame for the situation by no means 
attaches wholly to the promisers, the households failing to meet their obligations. Banks in 
those years hoped for good returns, and virtually persuaded the future debtor to take the loan, 
often failing to verify the creditworthiness of the household . In other words, the recipients of 
the promises walked into a trap of their own making. 
Table 1 Growth of non-performing loans, 2008-2011 
                                                          
7
The mounting personal indebtedness, including the problem of so-called foreign-exchange debtors, is covered in 
numerous studies.  (See, for example, European Economic Advisory Group 2012, pp. 125-127, Hudecz, 2012.) 
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Data in December 2008 = 100. 
Types December 2008 December 2009 December 2010 December 2011 
All loans 100 134.8 164.6 194.3 
Loans to households 100 145.8 188.3 228.6 
Mortgage loans to households 100 168.1 232.1 310.6 
Loans to other sectors 100 124.8 143 163.1 
Source: Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Szervezete [Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority] (2012d). 
 
Table 2 Proportion of non-performing loans payment, 2008-2011 (per cent) 
Types December 2008 December 2009 December 2010 December 2011 
All loans 12.3 17.5 20.9 25.2 
Loans to households 16.7 24.5 28.3 34.7 
Mortgage loans to households 12.5 20.2 24.5 32.4 
Loans to other sectors 9.9 13.5 15.8 18.7 
Note. ’Proportion’ in relation to all loans in the category (e.g., nem-performing loans to households were 16.7 per cent of all loans to 
houseolds in December 2008) 
Source: Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Szervezete [Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority] (2012d). 
 
 The economic stagnation and recession have also reduced the solvency of the 
corporate sector. The number of overdue loans to firms has increased alarmingly. This 
threatening tendency is illustrated by Figure 2, and the last lines of Tables 1 and 2. (‘Other 
sectors’ in the two tables mean the loans given to the sector of firms and the projects financed 
by the EU and the Hungarian state.) Figure 2 shows that a quarter of of all project loans falls 
into the non-performing category. This rate is seriously high. 
  
Figure 2 Proportion of overdue loans 
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Note. Loans late more than 90 days are called overdue loans by the Hungarian National Bank. 
Source. Magyar Nemzeti Bank [Hungarian National Bank] (2012), pp. 33. 
 
The conceptual framework of this study gives a more explicit name to the trend in the figure 
and the two tables: the number of firms not keeping their payment promises to banks is 
increasing. The same applies to many LGOs, which borrowed sizeable sums that they cannot 
repay over the promised term.  
  
D.   Government (central or local) promises to citizens 
Some regulatory measures spell out obligations undertaken by the state, others make silent 
implicit promises. Let us look now at those where the state shouldered long-term obligations. 
The promised, the beneficiaries of the regulations, trusted in the state’s promises and 
accordingly organized their lives, family budgets, and savings habits in the long term. 
 Let me take a single example, albeit a weighty one. The Hungarian government in 
2010 and 2011 unexpectedly and radically altered the pension system. Hitherto a fixed 
proportion of the centrally collected pension contributions were allocated to private pension 
funds, called the ‘second pillar’ of the pension system. The new measures ended this 
important component of earlier practice. Since then the entire mandatory pension 
contributions go into the state pension fund. The capital accumulated in the private pensions 
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funds were swiftly transferred to the state budget. Much has already gone on day-to-day 
public spending (Simonovits 2011, European Economic Advisory Board 2012, p. 128). This 
study does not set out to decide whether the new laws meet the requirements of 
constitutionalism and protection of rights. Reputed lawyers at home and abroad have 
responded with a resounding negative to these questions. Rather than commenting further on 
the legality of the decisions I will stick to my subject. The insured, understandably, viewed it 
as a state promise that the capital accumulated from setting aside those pension contributions 
in private pension funds would remain their own property. In their view the radical alteration 
of the system, that is, the elimination of the ‘second pillar’ means the state has broken its 
promise. It is still unsure what the change means for the future income of pensioners. Nobody 
will be able even in the future to give an appreciable estimate of the loss or gain, as there will 
be no basis for comparison. No one will be able to say with hindsight what the pension 
income received from the private pension funds would have been had they not been abolished. 
Whatever the case, there is disillusionment, outrage due to the state’s broken promise and 
anxiety for the future among those pressurized by the state into abandoning the expected 
income from the contributions paid into private pension funds.  
   
E.   Political promises (by individual politicians, parties or movements) to electors 
Citizens of all parliamentary democracies often complain that politicians promise the earth 
during election campaigns, then fail to keep their promises. Vehement disenchantment with 
political parties and leading politicians has often been heard in Hungary since the multiparty 
system was reintroduced. 
 There is no space here to examine the relationship between political promises and their 
fulfilment rate in the last 22 years. Let us look just at the last elections in 2010. Party leaders 
and election candidates mouthed various promises. Fidesz, the party that won over the 
electorate, was cautious about making numerical promises for which it might be called to 
account later. One figure they gave, however, made a big impression on voters: they would 
create a million new jobs (Matolcsy 2010). (Hungary, incidentally, has a population of around 
10 million.) They gave themselves ten years to fulfill the promise. Later, when Fidesz had 
formed a government, one leading economic politician put the promise more specifically. 
They would fulfill it evenly: 400,000 new jobs would appear over the four years of their 
present term of office (Varga 2010). 
 So far the government has not fulfilled the first part of the promise due in the first two-
year period, the increase in the total employment rate is much slower than promised. And if 
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we disaggregate the employment figures, it turns out that they were blown up by the rapid 
increase of so-called public work, which replaces social benefits with mostly part-time jobs 
paid at starvation wages by the state. Job numbers in several sectors with actual employment 
in normal employment relationships fell. 
 The promise was addressed primarily to those who would gladly have taken a job. 
They suffered a big financial loss. Mention must also be made of the disillusionment. 
Unemployment generates fear among those who still have a job, but feel insucere because of 
the threat of unemployment..Many anxious people were filled with hope by the party seeking 
their vote. Now they are dismayed to find the promise has not been kept. 
 
 
Interactions 
 
Spill-over effects in production and the credit system 
For each basic type of breach of promise discussed in the last section of the paper it was 
established that it caused not only material losses to the aggrieved but also effects on their 
mental state, mood and well-being. Each type of damage was examined separately. In actual 
fact there are many types of interaction between the thousands or hundred thousands of 
micro-events. 
 The best known is the interaction between belated or omitted payments, i. e. spill-over 
effects of breaches of Type B promises, in this paper’s terminology. Firms G, H, and I should 
be paying firm M for products received, but they break their contracts and fail to pay. Firm M 
in turn owes money to firms X, Y and Z, but not having received its dues, it in turn, against its 
intention, breaches its promise and does not pay. Firms X, Y and Z are now unable to pay 
other obligations, and so on. The phenomenon is called chain-indebtedness in the Hungarian 
economic jargon. Each link in the chain means that there is a debtor in arrears and a forced 
creditor waiting for his money in vain. Circular indebtedness appears when the chains formed 
by overdue payments link together. The troubles form a spiral, a vicious circle, an 
accelerating, deepening whirlpool of indebtedness. For example, circular indebtedness is 
estimated to be 400 billion forints in the construction industry, which is approximately one 
quarter of the production value there. The situation is well described by a press-release on the 
topic: “No way out from the vicious circle of circular indebtedness?” (MTI – Stop, 2012. See 
also MTI – Figyelő, 2012) 
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 One after the other, the indebted firms start to fail, and B and C-type breaches turn into 
type A. Producer or provider firms in deep financial straits cannot meet their obligations to 
produce or provide services. This too has spill-over effects well known from the economics of 
trade cycles. Production growth deceleration may switch into recession. Shrinkage of the real 
economy may hit back on the financial positions of firms, which accelerates the spiral of 
indebtedness. 
 The situation is worsened because the victim of the C-type breaches of promise 
(failures to service or make repayments of bank loans) is the banking sector. However much 
the banks themselves may be to blame for allowing the proportion of loans in arrears and non-
performing loans to rise so high, the consequence is the serious deterioraton of the state of 
affairs in the banking sector. This is one of the factors behind the alarming fall in the level of 
bank lending activity. This too holds back production growth and may contribute to a 
recession process. There then appears in the chain of cause and effect a further consequence 
mentioned before: liquidity in the household and corporate sectors is reduced, which produces 
further spirals of promise breaching. 
 Mass occurrences of broken micro-promises of types A, B, and C, through the 
mutually reinforcing interactions just detailed, eventually cause serious macroeconomic 
damage. 
 
 
Spirals of bad mood and bad example 
Economists, citing the well-known relevant theories, easily recognize the spirals engulfing 
production and the credit system, and the multiplyer effects whose interactions turn a 
thousand little micro promise breaches into a macro-level crisis. However, it is more a task for 
social psychologists to describe how the annoyance and outrage at the breaches of promise 
pass from one person to the next. One person leaves his home angrily because the plumber 
failed to turn up yesterday and there was no hot water in the pipes this morning. Driving along 
he shouts insultingly at a pedestrian crossing the road, who also ends up in an upset mood and 
quarrels with colleagues at work. At the end of the day, all these people return home feeling 
nervous and irritated. They stick their or own anger and bad mood on the members of the 
family .The bad temper and tensions spread like a disease from one person to the next. 
Nor is the problem confined to mood. Bad examples also spread like an infection. 
Many people say to themselves, “If others keep breaking their promises, why should I be the 
fall guy who always keeps his word?” The more bad examples people see, the more they 
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wonder why they should be the exception and take their promises seriously, to their own 
detriment. These spill-over effects from person to person cause the vicious circle to spread 
and worsen: promise-breaking breeds yet more promise-breaking. 
 The people in the political/government sphere and the business sphere are not isolated 
from each other. Talented and/or smart ones pass repeatedly through the revolving doors 
between them, holding political, administrative and commercial posts by turns. Once they 
have become accustomed to irresponsible promise and responsibility-breaking in one sphere 
they will take the behavior pattern with them into the other. 
 It is especially dangerous for the feeling to emerge among ordinary people that “those 
above,” those at the pinnacle of political power, are not keeping their word. Tables 3 and 4 
show the findings of an international survey. Table 3 ranks the countries based on the share of 
those, who strongly doubt the trustworthiness of politicians. Hungary is among the first ones; 
two third of the population strongly or very strongly disagree with the optimistic statement 
according to which politicians keep their election promises. Table 4 presents the rankings 
based on the proportion of those strongly believing in the trustworthiness of politicians. In this 
table Hungary is among the tail-enders: only every tenth Hungarian thinks (with strong or 
even with very strong conviction) that politicians fulfill their promises made during the 
election campaigns. 
 
 
Table 3 Public opinion: Do politicians keep their promises? 
Country 
 Ratio of citizens who doubt the 
reliability of politicians (per cent) 
Italy 77.8% 
Latvia 67.4% 
Hungary 66.7% 
Russia 65.1% 
Japan 61.0% 
Spain 60.1% 
Israel (Jews) 59.2% 
Germany (East) 59.1% 
Slovenia 56.6% 
France 56.6% 
Irelans 55.0% 
Czech Republic 52.7% 
Poland 52.5% 
United State of America 51.1% 
Germany (West) 49.5% 
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New Zealand 47.9% 
Sweden 46.5% 
Great Britain 46.4% 
Australia 44.8% 
Canada 42.4% 
Cyprus 35.4% 
Norway 33.9% 
Switzerland 32.8% 
Philippines 30.8% 
Bulgaria 23.7% 
Izrael (Arabs) 18.2% 
Total 49.0% 
Note. The survey was conducted in the framework of the „International Social Survey Programme”, in 1994-1995. Information on the data 
collection methodology is described in the cited source as follows: 
The following question was asked: 
„How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement. 
People we elect as (MPs) try to keep the promises they have made during the election  
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
8 Can't choose, don't know 
9 NA, refused” 
The above percentages were arrived at by calculating the proportion of those choosing 4 or 5 to all answers, and countries were listed in 
the descreasing order of the proportions.   
The table was compiled by Tamás Keller. 
Source. International Social Survey Programme (1996).  
  
 “If those up there can get away with not fulfilling their promises, then why should I, 
the little man, fulfill 100 % of my promises?” It is distressing that this line of thought have 
probably crossed many people’s mind.  
 
 
 
Table 4 Public opinion: Do politicians keep their promises? 
Country                                 
Ratio of citizens who believe 
in politicians (per cent)  
Izrael (Arabs) 44.2% 
Philippines 41.0% 
Cyprus 32.7% 
Bulgaria 31.7% 
Ireland 29.5% 
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Australia 28.4% 
Norway 27.6% 
Canada 25.7% 
New-Zealand 24.5% 
United States of America 24.2% 
Switzerland 23.5% 
France 21.2% 
Great Britain 21.1% 
Germany (West) 19.7% 
Slovenia 18.5% 
Izrael (Jews) 16.5% 
Poland 14.8% 
Spain 14.8% 
Czech Republic 14.6% 
Germany (East) 14.3% 
Sweden 14.2% 
Japan 12.9% 
Italy 10.4% 
Russia 10.3% 
Hungary 10.2% 
Latvia 8.8% 
Note. Information on the survey is available in Table 3. 
The above percentages were arrived at by calculating the proportion of those choosing 1 or 2 to all answers, and countries were listed in 
the descreasing order of the proportions.   
The table was compiled by Tamás Keller. 
Source. International Social Survey Programme (1996).  
 
 
 
The moral judgment of fulfilling and breaching promises 
 
Many types of doubt might fill the heart of people. Still, I hope that most continue to believe 
that promises should be fulfilled. Why do they think that? The answer is not self-evident, 
since the promiser often benefits from breaking his or her word. Here, the topic of my paper 
leads to a much wider issue, to the moral judgment of people’s acts.    
 There is no agreement among philosophers about the answers to the fundamental 
questions of ethics.
8
 I do not feel competent to comment on the debates between the various 
schools of philosphy. I would like to set out from a different approach. How do average 
people, the acting agents of the economy and politics, judge the breaching of promises?  
                                                          
8
 The “Promises” entry of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008) provides an extensive overview of 
the main alternative ethical theories. Also see Patterson’s (1992) paper, which comments on several important 
works from the literature dealing with the values of promises.  
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 A few pages earlier, when reviewing the main types of breaching promises a comment 
returned repeatedly: the victims of unfulfilled promises are annoyed and upset. Actually, they 
condemn even the mere fact of breaching of promises, since common decency would demand 
that everyone should keep his word. “I fulfill my promise – so I expect the same from you. 
Where would it lead to if everyone offers promises and later does not care a rap for his own 
words?” Quite many think this way, perhaps the great majority of people. Even if we have 
never had a philosophy book in our hands, here we get close to the Kantian position, and to 
the contractualists, to the school of philosophy, which derives ethical principles from the idea 
of a social contract.  
 My paper, first when discussing the main types, and later when introducing the 
interaction between the acts of breaching promises, highlighted with great emphasis the 
adverse consequences of the phenomenon. People think along similar lines, when they 
recount: how much loss they suffered as a result of the other party’s breaching of promise. In 
these instances the argument gets close to the line of thinking of another school of philosophy, 
to the so called consequentialists. We need to behave ethically, among others we need to 
fulfill our promises, because unethical behavior has adverse consequences. This line of 
reasoning is almost obvious for economists. 
 When reading the literature of the issue in works written by philophers, I got the 
impression that perhaps the above mentioned alternative approaches are not theoretically 
incompatible with each other.
9
 In any case, they coexist, supplement and strengthen each 
other in the moral judgments of everyday people.  
 Let us see an example.The patient is angry, because the doctor, who treats him at a 
high cost in his private practice, promised that he will see him at a specific time – and yet he 
kept him waiting for a very long time. If following this he makes a judgment, then he sees this 
situation as the breach of common decency. “What would the doctor say, if next time he 
would be kept waiting for hours by his high charging lawyer or car mechanic?” And of 
course, he considers important the consequence he suffered by the breach of promise, the time 
wasted while waiting. He makes a comparison, he runs some kind of cost and benefit 
calculation in his mind: he would not have waited more than this either and he would have 
saved the fee, if he went to a government-financed, free clinic.  
 When we get over the first annoyances or indignation caused by the breach of promise 
and we bring ourselves to make moral judgments, then – like in the case of the judgments 
                                                          
9
 In the philosophical literature there are such works that attempt partial, limited reconciliation. See for example: 
Nozick (1974).   
 20 
made within the juridicial system – we do not apply simple formulas, overly simplistic 
schemas. We cannot be satisfied with the statement: all breaches of promise should be 
morally condemned. We need to weigh the circumstances under which the events unfolded.  
 I have not found such works in the literature written by legal scholars, sociologists or 
philosophers, which reported on systematic observation or questionnaire based survey among 
the Hungarian population. However, there are relevant American studies available. It is 
possible of course that the distribution of the American reactions is different from the 
Hungarian in similar situations, but even in this case, it will be illuminating (at least from the 
perspective of the applied research methodology) to report about a few American studies.  
 The title of Shavell’s (2006) paper hits right into the middle of our topic: “Is Breach of 
Contract Immoral?” The author has conducted a small sample survey. For instance, he asked 
the following question from the interviewees. Suppose that a Renovator has made a contract 
to do a kitchen renovation for a Homeowner. The Renovator then discovers that the job would 
cost him a lot more than he had anticipated. So the Renovator did not fulfill his promise. 
Question: Would the responder judge the breach of contract as unethical? The responders 
were able to answer on a five-point scale: beginning with the “Grade (1) definitely unethical” 
and ending with the “Grade (5) definitely ethical” answer. 38 answers out of the 41 responses 
spread between Grade (1) and Grade (3), and all together only three classified the situation 
“Grade (4) somewhat ethical”. No one classified it “Grade (5) definitely ethical”. However, 
the distribution of the answers significantly changed, when the original question was 
supplemented with other important details. For instance, it was included that: Did they state in 
advance, what to do, if the costs rise above the originally calculated costs? Did they state in 
advance that the contract is valid even if the costs are higher than originally expected? Did 
they agree in advance about the indemnity in an event of the Renovator not fulfilling his 
promise? The more the respondents understood that there may be “mitigating circumstances” 
the more carefully they judged the situation.  
 Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron’s (2009) paper attempts to probe the moral judgments of 
people about the breaching of contracts through the help of similarly realistic examples. In 
relation to several kinds of hypothetical stories they asked questions, and to each story they 
surveyed the stances of different samples. For example, in one of the stories they offered for 
the interviewees to comment, the following problem arose. A couple rents out a restaurant for 
an anniversary party. However, the owner of the restaurant wants to waive the contract, 
because unexpectedly he received a much better offer. The story continues with two versions. 
In the first version the owner of the restaurant offers that they should sit down together, 
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discuss the problem and come to an agreement about the amount of the indemnity payment. In 
the second version there is no direct negotiation, the owner asks for an outside mediator to 
help determining the amount of the indemnity payment. All experimental surveys prove that 
the knowledge of the terms of contract and the circumstances related to the breaching of the 
contract significantly influences those, who form a moral judgment about the situation.  
 What special “laboratory” conditions offered themselves during the past few years for 
Hungarian sociologists and legal experts, when about the half of the country was debating 
over the problems of helping out the “foreign currency debtors”! They could spare the 
application of artificially invented stories, because the real events produced those cases in 
which people could have been asked for moral judgments. It is a pity that the Hungarian 
social scientists did not seize the opportunity.  
 At this point, it is useful to summarize in a general manner: what are those 
circumstances, which needed to be weighed for those attempting to form a moral judgment 
about any breach of promise.  
1. Did the promiser commit himself in a bona fide manner? Or he had already known 
from the beginning that he would not fulfill the promise, yet in a deceitful way he 
still made the promise?  
2. The bona fide manner is a necessary precondition of a correct promise – necessary, 
but not sufficient. Did he carefully think about whether the promise can really be 
fulfilled? Schiller’s hero was ready for any struggle and daring endeavor to keep 
his word. But was he thoughtful enough, when he promised to return in three days? 
There would have been no problem with the three days, if there were no rain and 
floods, if robbers did not attack. The promiser – and this is quite a common 
phenomenon – undertakes the tightest deadline possible, which works, if there are 
no unexpected setbacks. However, in fact it happens rather frequently that there 
are setbacks, and because of this the realistic deadline should always be set with a 
“margin”, with some “reserve time”. Poor Damon, who was just condemned by the 
tyrant to be crucified, did not think too much about the reserve time. Yet, in the 
case of others, in much calmer situations, we can expect more careful calculation 
indeed. And this is true not only for the promiser, but also for the promised. 
Returning to the example of the “foreign currency debtor”, both the debtor and the 
lender calculated negligently and irresponsibly, ignoring the risk of unforeseen 
difficulties.  
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3. In the case of a unilateral promise, did the promiser, or in the case of a bilateral 
agreement did both parties offer in advance careful terms safeguarding against an 
event of the promise becoming unfulfilled, and about what types of compensation 
the other party will receive in such case? 
4. What motives induced the promiser to breach the promise? Is he breaching his 
promise because of greater individual profit? Or external factors independent of 
him explain that the promise is only partially or not at all fulfilled?  
5. Did the promiser do everything to fulfill or at least partially fulfill the promise in 
the case of unforeseen obstacles? We respect Schiller’s hero among other things, 
because he struggled with a heroic effort to fulfill his promise.  
6. Regardless of the obstacles – does the promiser seek with due diligence the 
fulfilling of his promise or he does not fulfill his promise because of negligence?  
7. If the contract is broken, and the contract did not describe an exact compensation, 
does the promiser seek to reach an agreement with the aggrieved party? Or did he 
present the other party with a fait accompli in this respect? Or perhaps he keeps 
aloof from the compensation?  
Those who wish to form a moral judgment about the breach of promise must 
conscientiously weigh both the mitigating and aggravating factors. If the judgement is 
considered by the victim of the breach of promise, he must certainly face the question to what 
extent he is also responsible. Those who committed the real breach, frequently apply the 
“blame the victim” tactics as a defense mechanism. This type of retort is of course often 
rightly rejected by the aggrieved party. But no matter how justified is in the given case the 
rejection of such kind of mean-spirited attack, it does not provide an automatic waiver for the 
aggrieved party from voluntarily examining: whether he is also responsible for what 
happened. Often he commits at least one mistake of which he can admit if to no one else to 
himself: that he is carrying at least a part of the responsibility. Two partners are needed to a 
deceptive commitment: the one who offers the false promise, and the other one who believes 
in it and allows to be taken for a ride.  
 
Motives to fulfill or to breach promises; enforcing fulfillment  
 
I do not wish to narrow down the next argumentation to the cases of the breach of promise. 
According to my impression, even though this I cannot prove through any systematic 
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observations and statistical data, luckily the fulfillment of promise is more common than its 
breach. I will discuss the motives behind the two opposing phenomena side by side.  
 I wish to talk not only about the motives of the promiser, but also about the motives of 
the promised, the beneficiary of the promise. Moreover, besides the two actors in the promise 
relation, there will be a discussion about the actors outside of the relation, who influence or 
who could influence the course of events. The term “motivation” refers to voluntary acts. In 
parallel, we also discuss the phenomenon of the enforcement of fulfillment.  
 
Moral incentives 
Here, we will actually follow the continuation of the train of thought, which began in the 
previous section of the paper. The great majority of the promisers are honest people, who 
make a bona fide commitment and bravely strive to fulfill their promise.  
 Let us take a look at the business world of the market economy. It would be a big 
mistake to think that every transaction is regulated by contracts legally formulated by lawyers. 
Many kinds of input and output flows take place without any special promise, by the routine-
like repetition of “business as usual”. Or even if the producer and the buyer signed a contract, 
it does not mean at all that everything is regulated down to the tiniest details. The parties, 
trusting in the honesty of the other party, leave many questions open in the contracts. 
Macaulay (1963), a professor of law, conducted a survey among American businessmen and 
he found that they consider this informality natural, and they do not even attempt to build 
their relationships on all encompassing contracts. Incidentally, “contract theory” developed in 
economics provides a strict mathematical proof for the impossibility of a “perfect” contract 
and it would not even be economical to strive for such contract (Hart, 1998a and 1998b, 
Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005.) 
 The breach of promise could become less frequent, if the moral incentives motivating 
the fulfillment of promises would prevail stronger. I do not wish to start a moral preaching 
here, as it would obviously be received with an ironic smile. Evidently there is a need for an 
education that engraves in the brains of people the sanctity of the plighted word. In this 
process parents, all institutions of education, the managers of all work places and so on, 
should partake in. Out of the plethora of tasks in moral educations I highlight two elements.  
 One is the role of the media. Rare is the day on which an anomaly or even a scandal 
around the fulfillment of a promise would not appear on the screens, in the sea of letters of the 
print media and on the internet. But almost never appears such analysis, which objectively 
and intensely scrutinizes the ethical side of the events and would be ready to offer a moral 
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judgment. The flood of superficial news about the breach of promises gives birth to cynicism. 
“If so many are doing it – why should not I do the same as well?” 
 The other problem, which I wish to mention in regards to the discussion of moral 
incentives is related to the phenomenon, which I called in my works as the “the soft budget 
constraint syndrome”. In the first part of my study, when discussing the B and C types of 
breaches of promise, the case of those debtors (indebted households, firms, hospitals, local 
governments and other organization that are in financial trouble) have appeared, who do not 
meet their financial obligations. Should they be saved? Or should we leave them alone, and 
leave it to them how to get out of their difficult situation? When the topic arises in relation to 
a given episode, the commentators bring up numerous economic arguments in favor of saving 
them or against it: how would it influence production, employment, the state of the banking 
system and the government budget and so on. However, the ethical aspect of the question 
usually gets lost. The often occurring, almost certain “bail-out” has a pedagogical effect. It 
teaches the debtor to feel free to breach his promise; there is nothing to be ashamed of in 
doing that. But not paying back a debt is indeed shameful – even if there are mitigating 
circumstances! I have never recommended that without exception everyone, who cannot get 
out of trouble on his own, should be let down. However, this should not be done in mass 
proportions, in a way that the question of the debtors’ own responsibility hardly ever arises; 
very rarely is a single word spoken about the moral aspects of the breach of promise.  
 That is just what happened in Hungary when the government announced it would 
shoulder the full local-government debt of some 1500 small municipalities and much of what 
larger municipalities owed as well.  In the second case the bailout proportion is not uniform; it 
would depend on how wealthy or poor each community is. Thus the scale of rescue did not 
depend on how far the debt had resulted from irresponsibility and wastefulness by local 
leaders. The idea of the moral responsibility of those who had contracted the debt was not 
even mentioned in the rescue announcement. “Why be thrifty if those who battle to cut 
expenditure and strive to keep their promises are treated just the same as those who are 
irresponsible and waste the community’s money?” many local leaders grumbled. 
 I illustrate the idea with another peculiar, hardly believable episode of the long history 
of the “foreign currency debtors”mentioned already before. The episode, the wide-spread 
application of the so called “preferential full repayment” scheme early 2012, is worth a 
special mention. Let us think about two typical stories.  
 The person in the first story is a poor man, with little school education, who is the 
head of the family; he lived in depressing housing conditions, when he received the 
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opportunity to get a better flat through the help of a loan. The bank practically fobbed the loan 
off on him, and it did not sufficiently warn him of the risks. The story continues in a sad 
manner. At the time of taking out the loan, he still had a job, but since that he has lost his 
employment. Because of the weakening of the forint his installments grew high. Now he has 
been unable to pay for some time. Since the apartment where he and his family is living, 
served as mortgage, perhaps soon he will be evicted. In his case indeed two ethical principles 
collide: the principle of solidarity, which obliges us to help those in trouble, and opposing that 
the principle of individual responsibility, according to which each individual is responsible for 
his own decisions, even for his bad borrowing decision. In this case, according to my own 
moral sense the first principle, the principle of solidarity weighs heavier; this man and his 
family should be saved from the tight situation.  
 The person in the second story is competent, knowledgeable, well paid, with an 
economic or legal education. Some of them are working as government officials. He lives in a 
nice flat. He took out a large loan, because home building seemed to be a good investment, 
since housing prices grew month by month. It turned out that he made a bad decision; he has 
lost a lot on this business. He still has his job, he still makes good on his installments. 
Eviction does not threaten his usual life-style, since the place where he is actually living did 
not serve as mortgage. He bought or built another apartment or house. He will not become 
homeless, if this additional dwelling would be taken away from him. In his case I do not see a 
moral problem. If he made a profit on the investment, I would not envy him. If he lost – that 
should be his own problem.
10
  
 Well, the “preferential full repayment process”, which was legally enacted by the 
ruling political force, made it possible for the “foreign currency debtor” to repay his loan in a 
lump sum payment. The application of the procedure was tied to several conditions. 
According to Condition No.1, the debtors had to properly make the installment payments due 
during the past six months. By this they have already excluded the person in the first story, 
who is in such a big trouble that he is unable to properly make the necessary installment 
payments. Condition No.2 is this: the residual debt must be paid right away, by one single 
payment. How could our poor man gather so much money? In contrast, Conditions No. 1 and 
2 can be easily fulfilled by the person in the second story. The second story represents well-
to-do social strata, who are receiving special favors in exchange for their political support. 
                                                          
10
 The problem has been around for years, yet neither the government, nor the banks or the research institutes 
have organized large-scale surveys to figure out the social and economic distribution of the indebted households. 
No approximative estimations have been available to overview the proportion of those in need, ethically entitled 
to be supported, and those taking the loan for financing an investment. 
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 The preferential full repayment had to be paid in Hungarian forint, at an exchange rate 
imposed upon the banks by the government, exchanging at a significantly lower rate the 
arrears than the actual market rate. The people applying the “preferential full repayment ” 
scheme, (most of them similar to the person figuring in our second story) altogether have won 
370 billion forints with this opportunity, mainly at the expense of the banks, and at a smaller 
degree at the expense of the treasury (in other words of the tax payers). (Pénzügyi 
Szervezetek Állami Szervezete, 2012e).11 This is a staggeringly high sum, which, inexpicably, 
did not get much emphasis in political debates. 
 The ruling political group provided an extreme example of softening the budget 
constraint. Everyone can learn from this. It is worth breaking a promise – in this case: the 
commitment to repay the loan in a proper manner. If you took out a loan in order to make a 
profit and you belong to the well-to-do strata of society favored by the government, you will 
not face any disgrace.You even may receive a bonus, a significant amount of your debt will 
be paid back by others. 
 Against this “pedagogy” the naive warning of the parent or the teacher (“Be careful 
my child, not to make irresponsible promises!) does not carry much weight.  
 
Reputation 
In order to increase their reputation, the promisers are motivated to keep their word. The 
breaching of many small promises or even a spectacular defaulting on the fulfillment of one 
large commitment can destroy a reputation.  
 Firms have several kinds of motivations to increase their reputations. Recognition 
helps them selling their products and services. I have already mentioned that the buyers are 
gladly relying on familiar and highly esteemed suppliers. Better reputation is a significant 
advantage in the competition with rivals. To that extent, economic interests are connected to 
reputation as well. This is supplemented and even strengthened by psychological effects. “We 
are among the first ones”, “everyone has a high opinion of us” – this belief rightly flatters the 
company managers’ vanity.        
            The same can be said about the reputation of political parties and organizations. It is 
obvious that the voters do not base their choice only on the successes and failures of the days 
before the election, but reputation, which has developed over a long time, also plays a big 
role. Better reputation improves the chance of winning the elections and seizing power. But 
                                                          
11
 In order to illustrate the magnitude of the amount I indicate that this is more than half of the planned state 
budget deficit of 2012.  
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not only the fight for power motivates them to increase their reputation. The politician takes 
pleasure in his reputation, enjoys recognition and popularity – this is easy to understand 
psychologically. 
 The promiser fulfills his promise. Why? Is it because, this is what his conscience, his 
healthy moral sense tells him to do? Or is it because he knows that his honest behavior, the 
transforming of his words into actions will make a good impression on others and it will 
increase his reputation – and he can also leverage this into an advantage in economic 
competition or in the political arena? Difficult to separate the two; the two kinds of 
motivations jointly exert their effect.  
 The degree of reputation is not a continuous variable, which at times can be increased 
at an arbitrary rate, or at times its decline can be accepted without further due. It is one of 
those social phenomena, the speed of change – setting out from a given point – depends on 
the direction of the change. The reputation of a firm, a political party, an economic or political 
leader often increases slowly and gradually, as the numbers of the positive experiences grow 
among the people watching his work. But if it comes into the open that he breached his word, 
his reputation may suddenly collapse.  
 The third factor that motivates the fulfillment of promises is the legal and juridicial 
system that enforces the fulfillment. We will get to this point soon, but here I would already 
like to offer one remark ahead. In the business world the first and the second factors to a 
certain degree and under certain circumstances are able to replace  the third (Macaulay, 1963, 
Kornhauser, 1983). The stronger the promiser’s inner moral motivation to fulfill the promises 
and the contracts, and the more he is striving to improve his reputation, the less frequently 
legal recourse will be required to sort out the consequences caused by the breaching of 
promise to legal recourse.  
 
 
 
 
The enforcement of contract fulfillment by legal means 
 Here, we can safely limit ourselves to the business contracts. The breaching of the 
irresponsible promises made in an election campaign is not prohibited by law. This type of 
breach of promise is punished by the voter – provided that he recognizes the offense 
committed against him and he wishes (and is able) to employ the possibility of punishment in 
the polling-booth.  
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 The modern rule of law applies sophisticated legislation to punish the breaching of 
contracts. In private lawsuits they award compensations. For the deceitful false promises, and 
for the serious negligence leading to default on the fulfillment of a contract, the prosecutor 
can press charges and penalties may be imposed by the court. Special legislations regulate the 
bankruptcy proceedings, the sale of assets seized to pay off debts, the evictions as a result of 
mortgage foreclosures, and so on. The rigor of the law is not only meant to help compensating 
the aggrieved party as much as possible. At the same time, they expect a deterrent effect from 
it as well: the promiser should be afraid of the consequences of breaching the promise.  
 Even in the countries with the oldest tradition of the rule of law, the apparatus meant 
to enforce contract fulfillments does not work at one hundred percent efficiency. 
Unfortunately, in Hungary this machinery is much more creaking than in the more developed 
democratic countris. Many lawyers and corporate attorneys are less skillful than their 
counterparts in the West. Litigations are prolonged for long. Erroneous rulings are not 
uncommon. 
 The handling of bankrupt firms deserves special attention. If it comes to light that a 
firm is unable to repay all of its debt, then a bankruptcy procedure will ensue. This is in the 
jurisdiction of the courts; they will appoint a liquidator (a bankruptcy commissioner), who on 
the basis of the relevant legislation decides, among other things, about how to sell off the 
remaining properties of the firm, and about which creditor should be indemnified and to what 
extent. Here, we are far from the complete fulfilling of the contracted payment obligations, 
rather the benefits of the partial fulfillment and the remaining assets of the firm have to be 
distributed among the aggrieved parties of creditors. Several factors complicate the rear-guard 
fights for the last partial fulfillment of the contracts.  
 One of the complicating factors is the well known institution of modern capitalism: the 
idea of limited liability. The owners of a corporation or an LLC are only responsible for the 
debt accrued by the company to the amount of the capital they invested. In the worst case this 
can be completely lost; the remaining assets will be transferred to the aggrieved creditors. 
However, the owner is not responsible with his own private wealth. Also, if the owners and 
the executives were clever, then – somewhere between legality and illegality – at the last 
moment they transferred out a good part of the wealth of the company and they left not much 
for the indemnification of the creditors. There are many legal loopholes, which facilitate this 
type of trickery – for the benefit of the breaching parties, and at the expense of the aggrieved 
parties. Smart attorneys, pettifoggers specialized in the knowledge of legal loopholes write the 
contracts from the outset in such a way, that their client – without breaking the letter of the 
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law – can circumvent the spirit of the law, which would protect the interest of both parties in a 
fair manner.                    
               It is still the lesser evil, if the company under bankruptcy proceedings even exists at 
all. Other companies simply disappear, if they have a gallows look. The Hungarian business 
jargon calls these peculiar firms “phantom companies”. They appear on the scene, they 
promise the moon, they utilize the products and services ordered – but by the time they have 
to pay, they disappear. There is no one to call to account for the debt.  
 We expect from the state to enforce with its own instruments the fulfillment of private 
contracts, and by doing so to strengthen the “sanctity” of respecting contracts. During the past 
years in Hungary just the opposite move happened several times.. The government struck 
heavy blows at the prestige of private contracts. I present three examples; each caused a stir in 
the public.  
  In 2009, the “Budapest Transport Company” (BKV), owned by the capital city, paid 
out enormously large severance payments to many high ranking executives leaving the 
company. The payments were based on valid and legal labor contracts,The news created a 
public outrage. Fidesz, the current governing party, which was in opposition at that time, 
began a huge campaign – accompanied by the sympathy of the public – and demanded the 
repayment of these severance payments. Following the elections the parliament, now 
dominated by Fidesz hastily enacted a new legislation regulating severance payments 
retroactively (!) for several years back. According to this, on severance payments over a 
certain threshold value granted after 2005 a 98% extra tax was imposed in the state sector 
(budgetary authorities, companies owned by the state, etc.).
12
 Yes, but through this extra tax 
they not just regained for the treasury the immorally large severance payments of some 
transport executives, but they confiscated a part of, or the whole, compensations of such old 
teachers, doctors and other workers, who through a lifetime of diligent work acquired the 
right to a modest severance just in excess of the statutory limit set by the 98% confiscating 
legislation. The ruling political forces and the parliamentary majority dominated by them, 
abusing their legal opportunities, retroactively crushed the private labor contracts freely 
signed by the employers and the employees many years ago; contracts which included the 
provisions of the severance payments.  
 The other example is connected to that chain of events, which we have discussed 
already several times: the story of the “foreign currency debtors”. The bank and the debtor 
                                                          
12
 A detailed discussion of exceptions and parital exemptions is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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signed a proper contract. Today, it seems certain that significant portions of these contracts 
contained many such elements, which caused harm to one or the other or both parties, and the 
damages rippled through the other parts of the national economy. Mass revision of the 
contracts was fully justified. However, this should have been done voluntarily by the two 
contracting parties. The government can persuade them to do so, they can provide guidelines 
in regards to the content, and they can provide them with economic incentives to facilitate the 
changes. Also courts can annul the contracts and they can call upon the parties to sign a new 
contract. But under the rule of law the executive and legislative branches of the government 
cannot force retroactively the contracting parties to modify the contract against their own 
judgment. However, that is exactly what happened repeatedly, mainly at the expense of the 
banking sector. The executives of the banks protested, but eventually as a result of the 
governmental pressure they swallowed the bitter pill, and they were ready to apply the 
contractual changes being forced upon them. These tough state interventions certainly 
reduced drammatically the prestige of the “private contract”. 
 The third example is also drawn from the story of relations between the government 
and the banking sector. One important stage in the negotiations on foreign-currency lending 
was reached on 15 December 2011, when a “Minutes of Understanding” formulated in 
Hungarian and English was signed by Minister György Matolcsy and State Secretary Gyula 
Pleschinger on behalf of the government and Dr. Mihály Patai, president, and Dániel Gyuris, 
vice-president of the Banking Federation. (For the statement issued, see Bankszövetség 2011, 
pp. 5 and 9.) Point D) 1. stated, “The Government declares that the basis and the rate of the 
bank tax will remain unchanged in 2012 compared to the regulation in effect, while the rate 
will be decreased by 50% in 2013. The Government declares also that there be no bank tax 
levied on banks in 2014 higher than the bank tax defined by the legal framework of the 
European Union, or the average of the bases and the rates of bank taxes in effect in Member 
States.” Yet the budget for 2013 submitted to Parliament in the fall of 2012 left the rate of 
special bank tax unchanged instead of reducing it by 50 percent. The government had not kept 
its promise.  
 Concluding remarks 
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In a dictatorship the tyrant does not have to make promises to the people.
13
 He does not rise 
time and time again to the top post of the country through the open competition of alternative 
political forces; rather this happens with the help of the machinery of repression and violence, 
i.e. the institutional system of the dictatorship serving him to hold onto his power. In contrast, 
in a democracy the promises of the competing parties play an especially important role. The 
voter – if he has good memory – can assess how much the ruling party fulfilled during the 
past term the promises made before the last election. If they fulfilled their promise, then it will 
strengthen them, if they breached it, then it will weaken the trust towards them. Of course, 
comparing the promise and the action is not the only criterion, according to which candidates 
are compared, but without a doubt it is one of the most important ones. Those who weaken the 
trust in the political promises, undermine one of the foundations of democracy. 
 The socialist command economy can do without promises. The vertical coordination is 
moved by commands, which are given by the superior body to a subordinate body. A 
command is a command – there is no need for promises, rather the command should be 
fulfilled. In contrast, in the capitalist market economy, the horizontal coordination primarily 
takes place according to voluntary private contracts between buyers and sellers. Of course, the 
fulfillment of private contracts, the fulfilment of promises made by the seller and the buyer, 
the creditor and the debtor, is only one kind of the various coordination processes, but without 
a doubt one of the most important one. Those who weaken the prestige of the private 
contracts, undermine one of the foundations of the capitalist market economy. 
 It is to be feared that in Hungary exactly this – the weakening of the foundations – 
takes place right in front of our (and outside world’s) eyes. I do not know what others 
experience in their countries about the spread of the above detailed hideous phenomena – 
researchers there are expected to uncover and analyze them. I am certain, however, that the 
population of Hungary is suffering due to the almost everyday routine of broken promises. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 It is not a coincidence that it is Napoleon to whom the following statement is attributed: “The best way to keep 
one’s word is not to give it.”  
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